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REMITTITUR PRACTICE IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
Remittiturl is the procedure by which a trial judge gives a plaintiff who 
has received an excessively favorable jury verdict the option of accepting 
a specified reduction in the jury verdict or submitting to a new trial.2 Since 
its approval by a federal court in 1822,3 remittitur has been accepted and 
employed by the courts of the United  state^.^ Despite this century and a 
half of use, the procedures and standards utilized by the federal courts 
have been, and still are, far from un i f~ rm.~  Doubts are still expressed 
about the constitutionality6 and efficacy7 of remittitur. 
- - -  
1. Technically, the remittitur is "[aln entry on the record by which the plaintiff declares 
that he remits a part of the damages which have been awarded him." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO- 
NARY 1458 (4th ed. 1951). However, the term is commonly used to refer to the entire 
procedure. 
2. See 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1974); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 2815 (1973); Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs 
in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 12 DEFENSE L.J. 521 (1%3); Carlin, Remittiturs 
and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942); James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of 
Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur andddditur, 1 DUQUESNE L. REV. 143 
(1963); Comment, Additur and Remittitur in Federal and State Courts: An Anomaly?. 3 
CUMBER.-SAM. L  REV. 150 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law--Right to Jury Trialiludicial 
Use of Additi~rs in Correcting Insufficient Damage Verdicts, 21 VA. L. REV. 666 (1935); 
Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 318 
119341. ,.- - 
~ d d i t u r  procedure allows the losing party a choice between su plementing an inadequate jury verdict or submitting to a new trial. See .6A J. MOORE, supra f 59.05[4]; James, supra at 
153; Carlin, supra at 1, 24. This procedure has been held to be an unconstitutional re- 
examination of the jury verdict. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See note 16 and 
accompanying text infra, text accompanying notes 18-20 infra, and note 21 infra. 
Since Dimick, additur has generally not been allowed in federal courts, see, e.g., Miller v. 
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 220 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955); Mutual Benefit Health & 
Accident Ass'n v. Thomas, 123 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1941), although there is authority for the 
proposition that when the right to a civil jury trial is not derived from the seventh amendment, 
Dimick is inapplicable. United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F.2d 830 
(5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 646 (1939). The states are not bound by the seventh 
amendment guarantee, Olesen v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 896 (1957); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 258 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 
1%6), aff'd, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1968), and the courts of 
several states regularly employ additur. See, e.g., Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66, 130 A.2d 815 
(1957); Lea v. American Nat. Bank of Pryor Creek, 199 Okla. 360, 186 P.2d 321 (1947). Cf. 
Cox v. Charles Wright Academy, Inc., 422 P.2d 515 (Wash. 1967). Other states refuse to 
allow'additur. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Schmidt, 143 Mont. 505, 391 P.2d 692 
(1964); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952). 
3. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.A. Mass. 1822). See notes 12-16 and 
accompanying text infra. 
4. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing CD. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1966), reh. denied, 389 
U.S. 889 (1966); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Reinertsen v. George W. , .  
Rogers Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975); Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 
726 (6th Cir. 1974); Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973); Mattpx v. News 
Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 388 U.S. 858 (1949); Bristol Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Boy, 261 F. 297 (6th Cir. 1919). See also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 
114, 383 U.S. 53, 66 (1966). 
5. See notes 21-90 and accompanying text infra. 
6. See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 
512 F.2d 671, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Carlin, supra note 2. 
7. See Carlin, supra note 2, at 1, 13. See also 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, ll 59.05[3], 
n. 42i. 
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The first sectiong of this Note examines and evaluates the mechanics 
of remittitur procedure in the federal  court^.^ The second sectionlo focuses 
on the major unresolved issue of remittitur procedure: whether a plaintiff 
who elects to remit is entitled to appellate review of the remittitur order. 
The final section" of the Note evaluate remitting-plaintiff appeal proce- 
dures and suggest some ways in which federal remittitur procedure might 
be made more efficient and more responsive to policy objectives. 
A. History 
The origins of remittitur practice in the federal courts can be traced to 
Justice Story's 1822 circuit court decision in Blunt v .  Little. l2 The plaintiff 
received a jury verdict of $2,000 in an action for malicious prosecution, and 
the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was 
excessive. After citing two cases in support of the proposition that a new 
trial could be granted on the ground of excessive damages,13 Justice Story 
noted: 
[I]f it should clearly appear that the jury have committed a gross 
error, or have acted from improper motives, or have given dam- 
ages excessive in relation to the person or the injury, it is as much 
the duty of the court to interfere, to prevent the wrong, as in any 
other case.14 
Without further citation or authoritative support, he continued: 
I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict, and in 
so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law. . . . 
[ q h e  cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the plain- 
ti# is willing to remit $500 of the damages. l5 
8. See notes 12-90 and accompanying text infra. 
9. Although consideration of state court practices will be necessitated by the fact that 
some federal courts have felt constrained to adopt these procedures, see notes 62-67 and 
125-34 and accompanying text infra, this Note will be limited to an evaluation of federal 
court remittitur practice. Inclusion of extensive discussion of state court procedures would 
confuse and complicate the issues, since these practices vary widely. See Busch, supra note 2. 
See also Carlin, supra note 2; Hullverson, Remittiiur and Other Things, 28 J. Mo. B. 81 
(Feb. 1972); Comment, Additur and Remiititur in Federal and State Co~rris: An Anomaly?, 
supra note 2. 
Another reason for focusing exclusively on the federal courts is the significance of the 
remittitur device in that forum. Of the 103,530 civil cases commenced in the federal district 
courts in 1974,24,231, or 23.4%, were suits for personal injury or property damage. REPORTS 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 389 (1974). If 
tried to a jury, each would present a potential excessive verdict case. Contract actions, real 
property actions, and actions under statutes can also result in excessive jury verdicts. A 
recent review of 1974 closed-case docket sheets for the district courts of the Second Circuit 
revealed that almost 50% of all suits involving money claims were admiralty cases, many of 
which were potential candidates for remittitur. 
10. See notes 91-152 and accompanying text infra. 
11. See notes 153-63 and accompanying text infra. 
12. 3 F .  Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.A. Mass. 1822). 
13. Id. at 761. 
14. Id. at 761-62. 
15. Id. at 762 (emphasis added). 
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Justice Story's simple statement, unsupported by authoritative prece- 
dent in either American or English law,16 has served as the cornerstone for 
federal court remittitur. The paucity of precedent went seemingly un- 
noticed as the Supreme Court in early decisions consistently upheld the 
remittitur procedure.17 The procedure became so well-established that 
when its constitutional validity was seriously considered in Dimick v. 
Scheidt, Is a case in which additur,I9 the defendant's counterpart to remit- 
titur, was held unconstitutional, the Court noted: 
[I]t . . . may be that if the question of remittitur were now before 
us for the first time, it would be decided otherwise. . . . [W]e may 
assume that . . . the doctrine would not be reconsidered or 
disturbed at this late date.20 
The Supreme Court has apparently never again directly considered the 
constitutional issue, and from the language in Dimick it is fair to infer that 
no reconsideration is likely. 
B .. Procedure 
The seemingly simple idea of remittitur becomes discouragingly com- 
plex when it is put into action. This section sets forth the "how" of federal 
remittitur in all its complexity and measures each element of the procedure . 
against five standards: (1) fairness to the plaintiff, (2) fairness to the defen- . 
dant; (3) judicial economy; (4) the constitutional preference for jury trials;21 
and (5) non-constitutionally mandated public policy favoring trial by jury. 
16. Although a few early English courts used a remittitur-type procedure in some strictly 
limited situations, see discussion of early English practices in Dimick Y. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 
474, 477-80 (1935); Carlin, supra note 2, at 3-4, the device as practiced in the United States 
federal courts was not approved in England until 1884, Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q.B.D. 356, 
sixty-two years after Blunt. Comment, Statutory Authorization of Additur and Remittitur, 43 
MISS. L.J. 107, 107-08 n.7 (1972). The English approval of remittitur was later repudiated in 
Watt v. Watt, [I9051 A.C. 115. See discussion of Watt v. Watt and Belt v. Lawes in Dimick v. 
Scheidt, 293 U.S. at 480-81. 
17. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886); Arkansas Valley Land and . 
Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Clark v. 
Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 
(1895); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896); Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917). 
18. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See notes 2 and 16 and accompanying text supra and note 21 
irtfra . 
19. See note 2 supra. 
20. 293 U.S. at 484-85. 
21. Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to reconsider the question of whether 
remittitur is constitutional, see notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra, the issue is by no 
means dead. The Court in Dimick distinguished remittitur from additur by arguing that 
[wlhere the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a remission of the excess 
for a new trial is not without plausible support in the view that what remains is 
included in the verdict along with the unlawful excess-in that sense that it has been 
found by the jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an 
excrescence. 
293 U.S. at 486. 
This rationale has been attacked in Carlin, supra note 2, at 17-18, on the ground that in a 
remittitur case the verdict after remittitur is not an amount found by the jury any more than an 
increased verdict in an additur case would be. 
Because of such continuing doubts and the shaky precedents on which remittitur stands, 
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1 .  Procedural Steps to a Remittitur. The trial court remittitur device is 
employed only in cases tried to a jury. It usually arises when a losing 
defendant moves for a new trial on the ground that the damages awarded 
by the jury are excessive,zz or for a new trial and in the alternative for a 
r e m i t t i t ~ r . ~ ~  If the trial judge finds the verdict proper, he denies the mo- 
tions and enters the jury verdict as a final judgment.z4 If the judge deems 
the award to be excessive, he can grant a new trial "conditioned upon the 
refusal of the plaintW'z5 to remit a portion of the jury verdict,z6 or grant a 
partialz7 or complete new trial.z8 
a. Excessive Verdict or Not? The initial determination that the trial 
judge must make is whether the jury verdict is proper or whether it should 
be set aside as excessive.z9 This is a matter within the discretion of the trial 
Professor Moore, among others, has urged restraint in tampering with jury verdicts. 6A J. 
MOORE, supra note 2,Y 59.05[3], at 48-50. Thus, the Court's approval of remittitur in Dimick 
does not imply permission for unlimited innovation, and the seventh amendment right of trial 
by jury, U.S. CONST. amend. VII, must be considered in analyzing remittitur ractice. 
22. See, e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Arkansas Valley Lan c r  and Cattle 
Company v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 
1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1966), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1965). 
In some cases, the plaintiff may be the moving party if the defendant has prevailed on a 
cross- or counter-claim. See, e.g., Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Chapman, 4 F.2d 319 (5th 
Cir.). cert. denied. 268 U.S. 700 11925). 
- , 7 - -  , ~-~ .-- -- ,- 
23. See, e.&, Pellegrin v. Ray McDermott & Co., 504 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1974); Glazer v. 
Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967). 
There are other ways of initiating a remittitur order as well. In one case, Woodworth v. 
Chesbrough. 244 U.S. 79 (1917). it was the olaintiff who moved to be allowed to remit a 
. .. 
portion ochis jury award in order to preserve his judgment when it became clear that the trial judge would have granted a new trial because of the size of the verdict. 
The trial judge also has the implicit power to order remittitur. The judge may grant a new 
trial on his own initiative if the order is made within ten days of entry of judgment. FED. R, 
CIV. P. 59(d). The power to order that the plaintiff elect either remittitur or a new trial without 
motions from either party is thus implicit, as long as the trial judge complies with the ten day 
limit. 
Once the remittitur order is entered, subsequent procedure in no way depends on whether 
the defendant, the plaintiff, or the trial judge initially requested the remittitur. In most cases, 
however, a court-initiated remittitur will be improper. There will usually be a strong possibil- 
ity that the judge has not correctly assessed the situation since even the defendant is willing to 
accept the jury's verdict. Furthermore, unless defendant's counsel is incompetent, the judge's 
action would undermine the adversary system by giving aid to one party and, in effect, 
pointing out a way in which he can "do better." 
24. See, e.g., Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968); Morvant v. Lum- 
berman~ Mut. Cas. Co., 429 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1970); Brents v. Freeman's Oil Field Serv., 
Inc., 448 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971); Tucker v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 445 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 
1971); Brown v. Richard H. Wacholz, Inc., 467 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972); Pellegrin v. Ray 
McDermott & Co., 504 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1974). 
25. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1068 (5th ed. 1971). 
26. See, e.g., Bonn v. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 
1975); Reinersten v. George W. Rogers Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); Burnett v. Coleman 
Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974). 
27. See, e.g., Wagner v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 1319 (6th Cir. 1970), See 6A 
J. MOORE, supra note 2, Y 59.05[3]. Cf. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 511 
F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1975); Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 505 (8th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Young v. International Paper Co., 322 F.2d 820 
(4th r i r  \ .--- I. 
28. See, e-g., Diliard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1975). See 6A J. MOORE. suDra note 2. ll 59.05131. at 54. Cf. Massev v. Gulf Oil .. .. .-., --- - ~- - # - - - - - - . . - - -- - - carp., 508 ~ . 2 d  92 (5th Cir.), cert.' denied,-44 U:S.L.W. 3202 (1975); Holmes ;. Wack, 464 
F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1972); Cosentino v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co.. 389 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.). 
. . 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). 
29. Interference with jury verdicts in which the allegedly excessive damages are for pain 
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judge,30 subject, however, to the varying standards which have been estab- 
lished by the appellate courts. Some circuits permit the trial judge to set 
aside the jury verdict only if he believes that it is not supported by 
substantial evidence.31 In other circuits the trial judge is not at liberty to 
tamper with the verdict unless it is "grossly excessive"32 or "shocks the 
conscience" of the 
Of these differing standards, the most desirable from a constitutional 
standpoint would be the "grossly excessive" or "shocks the conscience" 
tests, since they permit the least "re-examination" by the judge of the jury 
verdict. Non-constitutional public policy favoring trial by jury would also 
favor this limited role for the judge. When fewer new trials are granted 
judicial economy is served as well. On the other hand, the "grossly exces- 
sive" or "shocks the conscience" standards may be unfair to defendants; 
utilization of these tests maximizes the defendant's chances of having to 
pay a verdict that is admittedly excessive. 
Once the trial judge has determined the appropriate test for excessive- 
ness, he applies it to the case at hand. If he finds the jury verdict to be 
within the limits of propriety as established by the standard,34 he denies the 
defendant's motions and renders final judgment in the amount of the ver- 
d i ~ t . ~ ~  Since a final judgment has been entered, the defendant at that time 
can appeal the denial of his new trial motion.36 If the defendant had 
originally moved for a new trial and in the alternative for a remittitur and 
the trial judge has denied both motions, the defendant can seek review of 
both denials.37 
In theory, the standard of review is very strict. It is usually said that a 
and suffering or some other injury that involves intangibles has been criticiied as outside the 
scope of the trial court's expertise. Busch, supra note 2, at 536-38. 
30. 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, ll 59.05[3], at 52. 
31. See, e.g., Shipe v. Leavesley Industries, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 190 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); 
Knight v. Nurseryman Supply, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Werthan Bag Corp. 
v. Agnew, 202 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1953). 
In one earlv case the court reauired that the iurv verdict be the oroduct of oassion or 
prejudice beforeit could be set aside as excessive. M e s s o r  Moore has condemned both this 
and the "substantial evidence" standard as being "too narrow." 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, 
n 59.05131. at 53 nn.19-20. ~ ~., ~ ~ -. ---- 
32. See, e.g., Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1945). 
33. See, e.g., Brents v. Freeman's Oil Field Service, Inc., 448 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Tucker v. Bethlehem Steel Coro.. 445 F.2d 390 6 t h  Cir. 1971): Collum v. Butler. 288 F. 
Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affld, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970);'~uddleston v. ~ r a h  Bros., 
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1960). 
34. Regardless of the standard used by the court, a judge should not tamper with a jury 
award for pain and suffering or other intangibles unless he finds the verdict highly excessive. 
Judges commonly reduce these verdicts between 15 and 25% by remittitur, Busch, supra note 
2. at 537. but this is clearlv imorooer. Where fine lines cannot be iustified thev should not be 
drawn. 1t is in cases involiing htaigibles that the jury serves its Gost importait function. See 
note 29 suora. ..- .. -.
35. ~ & - ~ e . ~ . ,  cases cited in note 24 supra. 
36. See, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra. The plaintiff might cross-appeal if he thinks 
the damages assessed by the jury inadequate. 
37. See, e.g., Bonn v. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d,89 (1st Cir. 
1975); Pellegrin v. Ray McDermott & Co., 504 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1974); Glazer v. Glazer, 374 
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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court of appeals will not reverse the district court on the denial of a new 
trial or remittitur motion unless a "clear abuse of discretion" on the part of 
the district court is found.38 However, one commentator has noted that 
while the appellate courts verbally adhere to this principle, trial court 
findings of non-excessiveness are rejected "pretty r o ~ t i n e l y . " ~ ~  Such a 
course of action can only be explained in terms of the courts' perception of 
fairness to the defendant. Yet, in terms of the other considerations perti- 
nent to remittitur, the standard of review should be strict-both in enun- 
ciation and application. With only a written record of the trial before him, 
the appellate judge is not well-qualified to review jury verdicts for exces- 
s i v e n e ~ s . ~ ~  Also, a less strict standard of review would inevitably result in 
more new trials, thus undermining the goal of judicial economy. 
b. Remittitur or New Trial? If the trial judge concludes that the jury 
verdict is excessive, he has three options open to him: he may enter an 
uhconditional order for a total new trial, enter an unconditional order for a 
partial new trial confined to the issue of damages, or order that the defen- 
dant is entitled to a new trial only if the plaintiff refuses to remit. 
In deciding among these three options, the trial judge must f is t  con- 
sider whether the excessiveness of the verdict was the result of "passion or 
prejudice" on the part of the jury.41 Most circuits require that a full new 
38. See, e.g., Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968); Neese v. Southern 
Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1972); Brents v. Freeman's 
Oil Field Service, Inc., 448 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971); Morvant v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 
429 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 429 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967); Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), relz. denied, 325 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1964). 
In a recent opinion, Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969), Judge Skelly Wright cogently enunciated the reasons for such 
stringent standards for reviewability. 
Two factors unite to favor very restricted review of such orders. The first of these is 
the deference due the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses and to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon 
a cold record. The second factor is the deference properly given to the jury's 
determination of such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum 
of damages. This second factor is further weighted by the constitutional allocation to 
the jury of questions of fact. 
Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted). In cases where the trial court "refuses to disturb" the jury 
verdict on a new trial motion, Judge Wright went on to note that 
the two factors press in the same direction, and an appellate court should be certain 
indeed that the award is contrary to all reason before it orders a remittitur or a new 
trial. 
Id. 
The Fifth Circuit has recently adopted the reviewability standards formulated in Taylor 
Terminal. Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1045 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (19721, 
See note 123 and accompanying text infra. The less stringent rule formulated by Judge Wright 
for cases where the judgegrants a new trial for excessive verdict is discussed in note 55 itgra. 
39. Busch, slrpra note 2, at 530. 
40. See note 38 supra. 
41. Although passion and prejudice can never be proved beyond doubt, its influence cpn 
be inferred with a high degree of certainty from the circumstances of some excessive verd~ct 
cases. For example, in Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 
1975), the plaintiffs closing statement to the jury, which included references to the decedent's 
children weeping at graveside, was held to have evoked "passion or prejudice" on the part of 
the jury. In Brabham v. Mississippi, 96 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.), rek. denied, 97 F.2d 251 (5th 
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trial be ordered whenever the trial judge discerns such jury bias.42 The 
Fifth Circuit, however, evidently feels that it is appropriate for the trial 
judge to "cure" the defective verdict with remittitur if the "passion or 
prejudice" affected only the amount of the verdict and not the assessment 
of liability as Although the caseload of the courts could be reduced 
by allowing trial courts to use remittitur as a "cure" for some verdicts 
tainted by passion or prejudice, this advantage is far outweighed by other 
considerations. It is almost impossible for a trial judge to determine that 
the jury bias which infected the assessment of damages played no part in 
the jury's finding on the issue of liability. There is always a danger that a 
jury which was unable to deal with the issue of damages in an unbiased 
manner was equally unable to deliberate dispassionately on the question of 
liability. 
Even after the trial judge has determined that a verdict attacked as 
excessive is not the result of jury passion or prejudice, remittitur is not 
necessarily indicated. Where the damages that should properly have been 
awarded are ascertainable with a high degree of certainty,44 or the defect in 
the verdict can be traced to a specific error in the course of the trial or a 
specific misconception on the part of the jury and the effect of that error or 
misconception is readily calculable,45 the trial judge should ordinarily give 
Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 636 (1938), a $10,000 verdict awarded to a boy beaten by a deputy 
sheriff was found to be the product of "passion or prejudice." The court held "that exces- 
siveness which results from passion and prejudice, however natural the resentment which 
arouses it, may not be cured." Id. at 214. 
Sometimes the argument is made that "passion or prejudice" can be inferred from the 
very enormity of the verdict. See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 
U.S. 69 (1889); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd,  388 U.S. 
130 (1966), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1966). This "bootstrapping" argument may take two 
different forms, both of which are usually rejected by the courts. The first is that the size of 
the remittitur requested indicated that the trial judge believed that the jury was biased. 
Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. at 75. The second is that the 
conclusion of the trial judge that the "amount of the verdict [was] . . . more than the law 
would permit" was tantamount to a finding of "passion or prejudice." Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 351 F.2d at 718. 
"Bootstrapping" arguments should not, however, be rejected out of hand. A valid 
inference of "passion or prejudice" can be drawn from the fact that the jury awarded 
excessive damages. Perhaps the inference would not be strong in most cases, but neither 
should it be blindly ignored. 
- 
42. See, e.g., Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931); 
Brabham v. Mississi~~i.  96 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.). reh denied. 97 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.). cert. 
denied, 305 U.S. 638 11938). See also 6~ J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 59.05'[3], at 59: 
43. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975). 
44. Such a situation might arise, for example, if the jury were charged with determining 
whether certain elements of the plaintWs claimed damages were recoverable and then with 
calculating the amount of the award on the basis of those findings. If the jury found that all 
elements were recoverable but awarded an amount 50% greater than the sum of those 
elements, remittitur would be completely appropriate. A new trial would be wasteful and 
unnecessary. See A. W. SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 142 
(1922). See also notes 56 and 79 and accompanying text infra. 
45. See, e.g., Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896). Under a mistake of law, the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that if it found certain facts it would mean that the 
defendant had ratified the purchase of a shipment of wheat and should be chargeable with the 
loss the plaintiff suffered on that transaction. The jury found those facts and included the 
amount of the loss in its verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the verdict 
could be properly cured by remittitur since the amount of the item was readily calculable. 
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the plaintiff the option to remit. The expense and delay of a new trial can 
be avoided, interference with the jury function is minimal, and the end- 
product is a verdict identical to that which would have been reached in a 
completely proper trial. When the issue of damages is not so clear-cut, or 
the excessiveness cannot be traced to a particular error of the judge or 
jury, the trial judge is faced with a more difficult decision. 
Common contexts in which this problem arises are personal injury 
suits where the judge deems the award for pain and suffering or other 
intangible or incalculable loss to be clearly excessive,46 defamation4' and 
malicious prosecution4* cases where the assessment of damages for "in- 
jured reputation" or "hurt feelings" are considered extreme, and cases in 
which punitive damages are assessed in an amount considered excessive as 
a matter of law.49 Sometimes a new trial will be the only appropriate 
procedure. 
If the trial judge does conclude that a new trial is necessary, he must 
then decide whether to grant it on somes0 or alls1 of the issues. This 
decision turns on whether he deems the issue of liability adequately and 
properly resolved by the first trial. If so, a partial rather than a total new 
trial can be granted, limited to the question of appropriate damageseGZ 
A new trial order is not ordinarily appealable until the new trial is 
had.53 Only after final judgment is entered in the second trial can the 
46. See, e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers 
Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975); Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 
506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), c.erf. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cerf. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. dettied, 
409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972). 
47. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Wigs  v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 
(5th Cir.-1973); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 
130 (1966), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1966); Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of 
United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967). 
It  is interesting to note that while these verdicts were reduced by remittiturs in amounts 
varying from IL3 to 1/10 of the original verdicts, none was deemed to be the product of 
o assi ion or ~reiudice." See note 41 suora. . ~ - - - -  * -- ~- ~ ~~- -
48. See, e.g., ~othschild v. Drake 'Hotel, Inc., 397 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1968); Thomas V. 
E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163 (J5.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grormds, 476 F.2d 471 
(3d Cir. 1973). 
49. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd,  388 
U.S. 130 (1966), reh. denied. 389 U.S. 889 (1966); Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of 
United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967); Gilbert v. St. LOUIS-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 
1277 (5th Cir. 1975). 
50. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
51. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. 
52. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. Of course, if the defendant's liability is 
stipulated or the result of a strict liability statute, a new trial would necessarily deal only with 
damages. 
53. See, e.g.. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 331 
(5th Cir. 1975); Peterman v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cerf. detried, 
417 U.S. 947 (1974); Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973); Eady v. Foerder, 381 
F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1967); Patterson v. Moore, 254 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1958). 
If, however, the issue on appeal is the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the new trial 
at all. it has been held that an immediate a ~ ~ e a l  wil  lie. Stradlev v. Cortez. 518 F.2d 488 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (new trial order entered four after trial and chafienged as beyond jurisdiction 
would be treated as final for purposes of appeal); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Britten, 301 F.2d 
400 (8th Cir. 1962) (new trial order made months after the entry of judgment and on the 
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plaintiff appeal the new trial order.54 The standard of review applied by the 
appellate court to a new trial order is usually "clear abuse of discretion" as 
in the review of the denial of a new trial motion.55 
c. How Much Should be Remitted? If the trial judge decides both that 
the jury verdict is excessive and that remittitur rather than an unconditional 
new trial is appropriate, he must then determine the proper amount to be 
remitted by the plaintiff. In some cases this sum is easily determined,56 but 
in many others the judge must select a proper verdict without clear guid- 
ance. There are no standard awards for items such as pain and suffering or 
damage to rep~tation,~' and in determining the amount to be remitted, the , 
trial judge must adhere to the vague standards required by the court of 
appeals for his circuit. 
The various circuits agree that some sort of "reasonable jury" stan- 
dard should be applied in evaluating the amount to be remitted,58 but the 
practices are still not uniform. Most courts have articulated no definite 
standards but "seem to fix the amount of the residue . . . at a figure that the 
court believes a proper functioning jury should have found."59 The Fifth 
Circuit and some other courts have adopted a "maximum recovery" rule, 
requiring that the amount remitted only reduce the jury verdict to the 
maximum amount a reasonable jury could have found in the case.60 The 
theory behind this practice is that a jury which gave a large award did so 
with the intention of giving the plaintiff the maximum recovery the law 
judge's own initiative was appealable); Demeretz v. Daniels Motor Freight, Inc., 307 F.2d 
469 (3d Cir. 1962) (new trial order appealable since trial judge gave a conditional remittitur or 
new trial more than ten days after entry of judgment and on his own initiative). 
54. See 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, ll 59.05[3]. If a partial new trial was granted, the 
defendant may be the party taking the appeal. 
55. See note 38 and acccmpanying text supra. It has been suggested that an appellate 
court should feel somewhat freer to reverse a grant of a new trial than a denial of a new trial 
motion. When the judge and jury agree--and the new trial motion is denied-the verdict is 
entitled to great weight. A grant of a new trial means that the judge and jury disagreed, and 
the appellate court has good cause to inquire more deeply into the matter. Taylor v. Washing- 
ton Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969). 
56. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. See also Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 
(1896). Professor Scott, among others, has suggested that where the amount of the excess is 
definite and easily calculable, the plaintiff should be compelled to remit. A. W. SCOTT, supra 
note 44, at 142; see also 35 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1921). Such mandatory remittitur has never 
been permitted, see note 79 and accompanying text infra, and the plaintiff may refuse to remit 
with or without reason. The anomaly created by this is obvious. Even in the situation where 
remittitur would be most useful and the result of a new trial would be completely predictable, judicial economy is still in the hands of a potentially whimsical plaintiff. 
57. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. 
58. See, e.g., Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 
(5th Cir. 1972); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 835 (1969). 
59. 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2,7 59.05[3], at 58. See, e.g., Lanfronconi v. Tidewater Oil 
Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 951 (1967); Meehan v. Central R.R. of N.J., 
181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Raske v. Raske, 92 F. Supp. 348 (D. Minn. 1950); 
Grobengieser v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 94 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1950). 
60. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Aquatic Contractors & Engineers, 446 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 407 
U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (1972); Schottka v. 
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  7 6  C o l u m .  L. Rev: 3 0 7  1 9 7 6  
308 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:299 
would allow. Thus, to effectuate their intent, the verdict is reduced only to 
the point where it is not e x c e ~ s i v e . ~ ~  
The federal courts in two states look to state practice to determine the 
size of remittiturs. In 1940 a federal district court in Wisconsin embraced 
that state's unique "minimum recovery" ruleG2 under which a plaintiff 
retained only that portion of his award below the minimum amount that a 
reasonable jury would award.63 The United States District Court for the 
' Eastern District of Tennessee has repeatedly looked for guidance to Ten- 
nessee state court remittitur cases, both on the question of whether a given 
verdict is excessive and on the question of how much of a verdict should be 
remitted by a plaintiff.64 Presumably, both these courts felt compelled to 
apply state remittitur standards under the Erie d~ct r ine .~~ommenta tors ,  
such as Professors Wright and Miller, have criticized such an application of 
Erie, arguing that 
[tlhe incidents of jury trials are for federal courts to decide for 
themselves, guided by the Seventh Amendment, and are not a 
matter on which state law should be given any effecLG6 
61. 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, 11 59.05[3], at 56-58. The Fifth Circuit has declined to 
employ the maximum recovery standard in calculating remittiturs from punitive damage 
awards. Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Clr. 1975); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1966), reh, denied, 
389 U.S. 889 (1966). In Gilbert, the court noted that punitive damages "are not administrab!e 
in the same fashion" as compensatory damages, and that any limitation on such damages 1s 
not a question of fact in which the jury's determination should be given great deference, but a 
question of law. 514 F.2d at 1280-81. 
62. Meissner v. Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Wis. 1940), aff'd, 124 F.2d 720 (7th Cir, 
1941). Professor Moore notes that the Wisconsin procedure was "apparently based on the 
theory that as the defendant has no option but'to accept the remitted verdict the utmost 
consideration should be given to him. . . ." 6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, ! 59.05[3], at 55. This 
argument would have been more tenable if the defendant had also been precluded from 
appeal. This was not the case, however. The defendant could still get his new trial if the 
appellate court found that the remittitur order was an abuse of discretion. See notes 83-84 and 
accompanying text infra. 
63. The actual Wisconsin procedure was somewhat more complicated than the text 
indicates. When the trial judge determined that a jury award was not appropriate he an- 
nounced both the maximum and minimum amounts that he thought a reasonable jury could 
have found. The defendant was then given 20 days to agree to pay the higher amount. if he 
did not so agree, the plaintiff was given 10 days to accept the lower figure. If the plalntlff 
refused to remit, a new trial was ordered. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN & H. ShllT, ELE- 
MENW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 854 n.3 (2d ed. 1970). Apparently, defendants never exercised 
their options to pay the larger amounts, and the "minimum recovery" standard became an 
accurate description of the procedure; the plaintiff had to choose between the minimum 
amount and a new trial. 
64. Shipe v. Leavesley Industries, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 190 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Pruett v. 
Everett Lowrance, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Knight v. Nurseryman Supply, 
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). 
65. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Wisconsin federal court did 
not explain its adherence to the "minimum recovery" standard. Wisconsin eventually aban- 
doned the standard in Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960), and 
there have been no subsequent federal court cases raising the issue. 
The Tennessee federal court explicitly held that Erie required use of state remittitur 
ractice in a diversity case controlled by state law. Knight v. Nurseryman Supply, Inc., 246 $. Supp. 925,928 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). In the Shipe case, however, the court appeared to back 
away from this position. Shipe v. Leavesley Industries, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E. D, Tenn. 
1971). 
-, 
66. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, Q 2802, at 31. 
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Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, the Erie question in 
federal court remittitur practice has not been definitively resolved. Most 
federal courts do not indicate whether or not they are following state 
remittitur practice, and no circuit court has squarely addressed the issue of 
whether remittitur is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes. Of the 
circuits, only the Fifth has promulgated its own remittitur rule.67 
If and when the other circuits choose to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead, 
there are convincing arguments for the adoption of a maximum recovery 
standard. If the theory that the jury intended to give the plaintiff the largest 
recovery the law would allow is correct, then this standard represents the 
least impingement on the province of the jury. Some have even argued that 
this is the only standard that "has any reasonable claim of being consistent 
with the Seventh Amendment."68 The maximum recovery rule would also 
be the most effective in reducing caseloads. The plaintiff is the party who 
decides whether or not a new trial will be had. If he knows that he is being 
given the maximum amount that this court believes a reasonable jury would 
award, he will realize that it is unlikely that on a new trial he will achieve a 
verdict as high or higher than the post-remittitur verdict suggested by the 
court. 
The maximum recovery standard is, however, the most inequitable in 
terms of fairness to the defendant. The defendant can quite properly 
complain that 
[he] has never had his damages assessed by a proper jury. Very 
likely such a jury might bring in a verdict for much less than the 
largest amount which can reasonably be j ~ s t i f i e d . ~ ~  
The defendant will feel that he is being penalized for the improper function- 
ing of the first jury. If given the opportunity, the defendant will press for 
the minimum recovery rule, arguing that but for the procedure of remittitur 
he would be entitled to a new trial. On balance, Professor Moore finds the 
average amount standard-which is, in effect, a compromise between the 
demands of plaintiff and defendant-the most desirable method for deter- 
mining r e m i t t i t ~ r . ~ ~  However, Moore does not consider the constitutional 
or public policy arguments in reaching his decision, factors which weigh 
heavily in favor of the maximum recovery ~tandard.~' 
67. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. 
68. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2815, at 104-05. 
69. Note, Constitutional Law--Right to Jury Trial-Judicial Use of Additurs in Correct- 
ing Insufficient Damage Verdicts. 21 VA.  L. REV. 666, 672 (1935). 
70. [It] gives the defendant the benefit of the full supervisory power of the trial court, 
and yet the plaintiff still has his option to refuse to remit. And it moderately serves 
the function of remittitur aimed at avoiding the judicial waste of a new trial, for the 
plaintiff still has a strong incentive to remit. 
6A J. MOORE, supra note 2, U 59.05[3], at 58. 
71. .Even if the maximum recovery rule--the standard which provides for the least drastic 
re-exammation of the jury verdict-is employed, there is still the danger of an unconstitutional 
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2. Appellate Remittitur. A defendant who feels wronged by a federal 
trial. court's handling of an excessive verdict case may appeal from the 
court's denial of a motion for a new trial72 or a motion for remittitur,I3 or 
from the court's determination of the amount to be remitted.74 An appellate 
court which finds merit in the defendant's objections can not only remand 
the case to the district co~rti .7~ the appellate court can itself enter a 
remittitur order.76 
The practice of appellate remittitur is open to criticism77 on three 
grounds: (1) a court of appeals, having only a cold record before it, is 
poorly equipped to determine whether--and the extent to which-the jury 
erred; (2) appellate remittitur gives the defendant another "shot" at the 
plaintiff thereby reducing the chances of settlement and adding to court 
conge~t ion;~~ and (3) appellate remittitur involves a more remote re-exami- 
nation of the jury verdict than trial court remittitur and thus comes closer 
to infringing the guarantee of the seventh amendment. Although the second 
objection is not of major significance, the first and third objections seem 
interference with the seventh amendment guarantee; the trial judge may merely substitute his 
assessment of a proper award under the standard rather than determine what a reasonable jury 
would have awarded. Since there can never be a guarantee that the amount fixed by the trial 
judge is even near what a properly functioning jury would have awarded, Carlin, supra note 2, 
at 15, it follows that all remittiturs necessarily involve some substitution of the court's 
judgment for that of the jury. The trial court should strive to minimize this interference. 
The method used to determine the remittitur in some personal injury cases is illogical, 
although probably not dangerous. In a few districts, contributory negligence is not a complete 
bar to relief; the verdict is merely reduced in proportion to the degree that the plaintiff was 
found to be negligent. For example, in Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 
1963), re l~ .  denied, 325 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), the plaintiff 
received a jury verdict of $108,800 for injuries sustained when a barge (!) fell on his head. The 
verdict was then reduced to $98,200 because the jury had found Scott lWo negligent an$ 
thereafter an order was entered granting a new trial unless the plaintiff remitted $23,200. T h ~ s  
procedure seems clearly improper. If the trial judge believed the jury assessment of damages 
incorrect, how could he accept their evaluation of contributory negligence without question? 
A judge who tampers with the jury verdict should at least consider each element which affects 
the amount of the final award. 
It  also seems unreasonable to reduce the jury verdict by a small amount for contributory 
negligence and then reduce that award on the pound that it was excessive. The contributory 
negligence subtraction becomes meaningless ~f it precedes remittitur. In fact, it is clearly 
improper for the reductions to be made in this order. If the plaintiff was 10% negligent, he 
should be deprived of 10% of the remittitur-reduced award, not 10% of his "grossly exces- 
sive" jury verdict. Otherwise, the trial judge is really substituting his own award, since he is 
necessarily deciding what he thinks this plaintiff should receive from this trial, and not what a 
reasonable jury would have assessed. 
72. This challenge can occur in two situations: the new trial motion is denied because the 
court finds the jury verdict proper, see, e.g., cases cited in note 24 supra, or the new trial 
motion is denied because the court has ordered a remittitur and the plaintiff has agreed to 
remit. See, e.g., Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974); Steinberg v. Indem- 
nity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). 
73. See note 37 supra. 
74. See, e.g., Bonn v. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 
1975); Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965). See also cases cited in 
notes 104-05 infra. 
75. See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967); Brabham v. Mississippi, 96 
F.2d 210 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 97 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 636 (1938). 
76. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Texas Co. v. Christian, 
177 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1949). 
77. Busch, supra note 2, at 550; Hullverson, supra note 9. Contra, Comment, AppeNate 
Remiflitur, 33 Mo. L. REV. 637, 644 (1968). 
78. Hullverson, supra note 9, at 98. 
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irrefutable. A jury verdict becomes a tenuous thing when cloistered appel- 
late judges feel free to tamper with it. 
C .  qfter the Remittitur Decision 
Once the trial judge decides that a verdict is excessive and that it can 
be cured by a remittitur in a certain amount, he informs the plaintiff that 
unless the plaintiff agrees to remit the excess, a new trial will be granted.79 
The plaintiff can then choose to remit, in which case final judgment is 
entered in the reduced amount,80 or he can refuse to accept a lesser 
verdict,81 and a new trial order is automatically entered.82 
Both the plaintiff's and the defendant's right to appeal hinge on the 
plaintiff's decision at this point. If the plaintiff agrees to remit, and a final 
judgment is entered on the reduced verdict, the defendant has the right to 
appeal.83 The plaintiff who chooses to remit, however, has traditionally 
been precluded from appeal on the theory that, by choice, he has ac- 
quiesced in the final judgment on r e m i t t i t ~ r . ~ ~  
79. See, e.g., cases cited in note 26 supra. Some courts have ordered plaintiffs to remit 
without allowing them the option of a new trial, but this practice has always been held 
impermissible. Kennon v. Gamer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Staplin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 
519 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1975); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1974); Stewart v. 
Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 470 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 474 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1972), 
mod., 479 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1973). 
The defendant is never consulted about the remittitur; if the plaintiff agrees to remit, the 
defendant's new trial motion is automatically denied. See 6A 3. MOORE, supra note 2, 
1 59.05[3] n.2, and cases cited in notes 104, 105, and 125 infra. The defendant can contest the 
remittitur order only on appeal from the final judgment which is entered. See, e.g., cases cited 
in notes 104, 105, and 125 infra. 
Because the defendant is given no opportunity to voice his objections, there has been a 
continuing debate over whether remittitur is unfair to defendants. The Supreme Court in 
Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889), held that the 
defendant, having benefited from the plaintiffs decision to remit, had no cause to complain of 
a remittitur order. Professor Scott agrees: "The defendant should not be allowed to object, for 
he is not compelled to pay more than the jury might properly award. . . ." 'A. W. SCOTT, 
supra note 44, at 122. 
Professor Carlin sees the defendant's position in a different light: 
After the defendant has made his motion for a new trial, he becomes a helpless 
bystander. . . . [I]t would seem to be something a little short of justice and consis- 
tency to tell the defendant that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury has not 
treated him fairly, and then to tell him that he must forego the privilege because the 
court and the plaintiff have agreed upon a scheme for disposing of the case without 
the aid of a jury. 
Carlin, supra note 2, at 12, 20. Carlin's argument, however, overlooks the fact that the 
defendant is entitled to appeal the remittitur order. There is, nevertheless, a grain of truth in 
the argument; it is doubtful that a defendant's objections to a remittitur order can be fully 
appreciated by an appellate tribunal having no "feel" for the case. The obvious remedy would 
be a requirement that both parties agree to a remittitur before the reduced verdict is entered as 
a final judgment. As Professor Carlin notes, "If both parties agree, of course, propriety of the 
remittitur cannot be questioned." Carlin, supra note 2, at 37. While such a requirement of 
bilateral agreement might be fairer to defendants, it would also increase the courts' caseload 
since fewer remittiturs--and more new trials-would inevitably result. 
80. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 104, 105, and 125 infra. 
81. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 
1975); Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1972); Cosentino v. 
Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 389 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). 
82. See, e.g., cases cited in note 81 supra. 
83. See, e x . ,  Neese v. Southern RY.. 350 U.S. 77 (19551. The defendant can also a ~ ~ e a l  
- .  * A  
on any other appro riate grounds. 
84. See notes 91-103 and 151-52 and accompanying text infra. 
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Under the prevailing view, if the plaintiff refuses to remit and a new 
trial order is entered, he can take no appeal until a final judgment has been 
entered following the second trial.85 (The defendant, of course, cannot 
appeal from the granting of his motion.) Once the final judgment has been , 
entered, however, the plaintiff can, on appeal, challenge the remittitur 
order that followed the first trial as an abuse of the trial judge's discre- 
tion. 
The appellate courts, however, seem quite hostile to plaintiffs who 
refuse to remit. A court will hold that a remittitur from, for example, 
$50,000 to $30,000 was not an abuse of discretion since a reasonable jury 
might find that amount. In the next breath the appellate court will decide 
that it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge at the second trial to 
affirm a verdict of $5,000 and deny plaintiff's motion for a new 
This attitude on the part of the courts of appeals actually makes 
remittitur unfair to plaintiffs. From the plaintiff's perspective, remittitur 
may be a coercive device, especially when only a small amount is to be 
remitted.88 The plaintiff would like to keep his entire verdict, but the risk 
and expense of a new trial are too high. Even if the remittitur is for a 
One early Fifth Circuit case, Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Chapman, 4 F.2d 319 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 700 (1925), shows how far the courts have gone with the consent 
argument and how unfairly litigants have been treated. The defendants had prevailed on a 
counterclaim, remitted the entire amount on the court's order, and tried to appeal. The court 
held that 
[tlhe writ of error of the defendants must be dismissed, for the reason that by 
entering the remittitur without protest and in compliance with the suggestion of the 
lower court, rather than have the motion of pla~ntiff for new trial allowed, they 
thereby acquiesced in that ruling and precluded themselves from seeking a review at 
the hands of this court. . . . The voluntary entering of the remittitur was in effect an 
admission that nothing was due on the cross-action . . . . 
Id. at 321 (emphasis added). The court's argument clearly strains credulity. The defendant 
neither "volunteered" nor "admitted" anything. He remitted in order to avoid a new trial in 
which he might have been adjudged liable; not because he agreed with the amount to be 
remitted. The court, in effect, gave defendant a choice between the "devil" and the "deep 
blue sea" and then termed the choice voluntary. 
85. See, e.g., cases cited in note 81 supra. 
86. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 404 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 835 (1969). See, e.g., cases cited in note 81 supra. It has been suggested that in this 
appeal, as in that of all new trial orders, the reviewability standard should not be as strict as 
that for review of the denial of a new trial. The theory is that in ordering a remittitur the judge 
is, in effect, disagreeing with the jury verdict. This remittitur order therefore deserves less 
deference than the order denying a new trial, since the denial of a new trial is e~idence~of  judge and jury agreement. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., supra. This less restrict~ve 
standard of review has been applied by the Fifth Circuit when reviewing protested, 
consented-to remittiturs. Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1045-46 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 
F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972). 
87. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (reduction from $75,000 to $45,000 no abuse, $16,000 at second trial affirmed); 
Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 931 (1975) (reduction from $85,000 to $35,000 no abuse, $19,000 at second trial 
affirmed); Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1972) (reduction from $15,000 to $5,000 no 
abuse, 0 at second trial affirmed); Cosentino v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 389 F.2d 726 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968) (reduction from $25,000 to $12,000 no abuse, $1,800 at 
second trial affirmed). 
88. If a small remittitur is requested, the plaintiff will be afraid to risk his verdict, yet it is 
questionable whether such fine lines can be validly drawn. See notes 46-48 and accompanying 
text supra. 
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substantial amount, the plaintiff may reluctantly decide to remit rather than 
take the chance of losing some or all of the remainder in the second trial.89 
After the plaintiff has "elected" to remit, his verdict is still not safe: if 
the defendant decides to prosecute an appeal, the appellate court might 
grant the second trial that the plaintiff sought to avoid or might even reduce 
the verdict more by requiring another remittitur. In the appellate court 
there is no way that the plaintiff can better his position if his consent to the 
remittitur order precludes an appeal. Some circuits have recently begun to 
appreciate that this may be unfair to remitting plaintiffs and have allowed 
them to reserve their right to appeal by fling remittiturs "under protest."g0 
A. The Supreme Court Decisions 
The belief that a remitting plaintiff should not be permitted to appeal 
the propriety of the remittitur order is apparently based on four early 
Supreme Court decisions, none of which, on analysis, proves very compel- 
ling. 
The first case was Kennon v.  Gilmer. g1 Kennon contains a statement 
to the effect that an appeal by plaintiff would not lie from a "voluntary" 
remittitur," but the statement is clearly dictum; the lower court had re- 
duced the jury verdict without giving the plaintiff the option of a new 
trial.93 Lewis v .  Wilson, 94 the next of these cases to be decided, involved 
procedural complexities not likely to be encountered todayg5 and the case 
should be accorded very little precedential weight.96 
89. See note 87 supra. 
90. See notes 104-40 and accompanying text infra. Cf. notes 141-50 and accompanying 
text it?fra. A plaintiff can also appeal a judgment entered on a remitted amount when the trial 
court orders the remittitur unconditionally. See, e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); 
Staplin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 519 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1975); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1974); Stewart v. Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 470 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.), reh. 
denied, 474 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1972), mod., 479 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1973). 
91. 131 U.S. 22 (1889). 
92. "[Ilf the plaintiff had filed a remittitur, and thereby consented to the judgment, he 
could not have sued out a writ of error. . . ." 131 U.S. at 30. 
93. The Court ruled that the reduction of the jury verdict without the plaintiff's consent 
was improper and that the plaintiff could appeal in this situation. Id. at 30. This rule has been 
followed consistently by the federal courts. See note 79 supra. 
94. 151 U.S. 551 (1894). 
95. The plaintiff remitted and signed an acknowledgment of satisfaction, but tried to 
prosecute this appeal more than two years later. Id. at 554. The defendant had no warning that 
the plaintiff might seek to have the judgment reviewed and would have been put in the 
unfortunate position of having to reassemble his case if the appeal had been permitted. This 
would have been especially inequitable to the defendant who had expressly waived his own 
right to appeal and was entitled to repose. 
96. The remittitur-new trial order in Lewis was made at a time when the trial judge would 
have had no power to grant a new trial. Thus, if the plaintiff had not agreed to remit, it would 
have been beyond the trial judge's jurisdiction to enter the new trial order. The Supreme 
Court, however, did not permit the plaintiff to appeal. It is doubtful that a plaintiff would 
today be foreclosed from appeal by a consent which the trial judge no longer had jurisdiction 
to request. This would be analogous to a direct appeal from a new trial order when the trial judge had no jurisdiction to order the new trial. See note 53 supra. 
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A more apposite discussion by the Court occurred in Koenigsberger v. 
Richmond Silver Mining Co. 97 and Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 08 but these 
too involved procedures that differed in important respects from modern 
remittitur practice.99 In both, the Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal 
was premised on the notion that the plaintiff had freely elected to accept 
the certain amount of the reduced award rather than submit to the uncer- 
tainties of a new trial.loO He was said to have "waived all right to object to 
the order of the Court, . . . the benefit of which he had availed himself."'O1 
A careful analysis of the plaintiff's position in the context of modern 
federal court procedure, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclu- 
sion that the remitting plaintiff reaps such great benefits. By consent to a 
remittitur, the plaintiff cannot "freeze" his verdict at the reduced amount. 
He can lose part or all of it on the defendant's appeal and can even be 
subjected to the uncertainties of a new trial if the appellate court reverses 
the trial court on the denial of defendant's new trial motion. The advantage 
that the plaintiff obtains from a remittitur is no more than the probable 
avoidance of the expense and delay of a new trial. Since the appealing 
plaintiff could lose as well as gain in the appellate court, he is not realisti- 
cally in the posture that the Supreme Court opinions seem to suggest: 
"having his cake" in the reduced verdict and "eating it too" on appeal.'02 
97. 158 U.S. 41 (1895). 
98. 244 U.S. 79 (1917). 
99. Both Wood~vorth and Koenigsberger were appellate remittitur cases, and in each the 
Supreme Court stressed the fact that the plaintiff obtained an "affrmance" of the reduced judgment after he remitted. Apparently, the "affirmance" was no more than an act of the 
judge who had ordered the remittitur reiterating the fact that the portion of the jury award that 
remained after remittitur was an appropriate verdict in this case. This may be significant in 
Koenigsberger since the plaintiff actively sought the affirmance and did not in any way ut the 
defendant on notice that he intended to file a writ of error. The plaintiff in Woo 1 worth, 
however, specifically stated in the remittitur he filed that it was "intended to be without 
prejudice to the plaintiff in any cross proceeding hereafter prosecuted by him." 244 U.S. at 
80-81, quoting the plaintiff's remittitur order. 
In Wood~vorth, unlike most other remittitur cases, it was the plaintiff that sought permis- 
sion to remit when it became clear that without a remittitur the trial court would gan t  a new 
trial on the ground of excessiveness. When a plaintiff tries to repudiate such a remittitur on 
appeal, it might be argued that his position is more inconsistent than that of a plaintiff who 
complies with a remittitur order made by the court and later seeks redress in the appellate 
courts. However, in both cases the judge sets the amount of the remittitur, both plaintiffs feel 
the same pressures to remit, and both are motivated by the desire to avoid a new trial. 
100. 244 U.S. at 82, 158 U.S. at 52. This reasoning has been echoed in at least one 
modem decision. Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1965). 
101. 158 U.S. at 52. 
102. In Woodworth the plaintiff attempted to preserve a right to appeal by stating in his 
fled remittitur that it was 
for the sole purpose of obtaining the entry of a final judgment herein, and of securing 
the affnmance of that  art of the iudrrment which is not so remitted. and is intended 
to be without ~reiudice to the da-intiff in anv cross ~roceedinc hereafter ~rosecuted 
- 
by him before thi Supreme ~ b u r t  of the united s h e s .  . . . 
244 U.S. at 80-81. Thereafter, the defendant fled a writ of error, and the plaintiff, a cross- 
writ. 
The Supreme Court disposed of the cross-writ in short order. It noted 
Woodworth is in the somewhat anomalous position of having secured jud-gment 
against Chesbrough arid yet seeking to retract the condition upon wh~ch it was 
obtained. This he cannot do. 
Id. at 82. The Court seems to be saying that since this position would be "anomalous," the 
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The Supreme Court cases, in sum, offer little guidance. None of the 
cases is directly on point, and the two cases that come closest to dealing 
with the issue are grounded in highly questionable logic. To the extent that 
the lower federal courts adhere faithfully to these supposed precedents, 
they do themselves and plaintiffs an injustice.lo3 
B .  The Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit is the only ckcuit to abandon totally the traditional 
rule that barred appeals by remitting plaintiffs. By now, it is well-settled 
Fifth Circuit practice that a remitting plaintiff can challenge the propriety 
of the court's remittitur order by appeallo4 or c ro~s -appea l .~~~  No differ- 
entiation is made between appeals taken from remittitur orders entered on 
the trial judge's own initiative and those entered in response to the defen- 
dant's new trial or remittitur motions.lo6 
A Fifth Circuit plaintiff who wishes to appeal can do so only after he 
has actually remitted.lo7 One plaintiff who attempted to ."short-cut" the 
plaintiff cannot appeal. However, what Woodworth did was not "anomalous" at  all. The 
remittitur he Ned said, in effect, "I will remit as long as I can cross-appeal if the defendant 
appeals." When the defendant appealed it was entirely consistent for Woodworth to attempt a 
cross-appeal. Perhaps the Supreme Court was trying to say, "We will not permit conditional 
remittiturs. Either you remit or you do not." However, if that was its position, the more 
appropriate disposition of this case would have been to remand so that the plaintiff could elect 
either to file a remittitur without conditional language or to submit to a new trial. Instead, the 
Supreme Court ignored the language in the remittitur filed by Woodworth and denied the 
appeal, apparently holding that the filing of a remittitur is effective acceptance of the finding 
that the reduced verdict is the proper one. 
103. Some decisions denying the right of remitting plaintiffs to appeal rely heavily on 
these Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., S. Birch & Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957); Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 
1965). The Fifth Circuit allows appeals by remitting plaintiffs, see notes 104-24 and accom- 
panying text infra, and has been criticized for its treatment of the Supreme Court cases: 
"[While Kennon and Lewis] may be distinguishable on their facts. . . . [i]t is not clear from the 
Fifth Circuit's discussion how it distinguishes [Woodworth and Koenigsberger]." Reinertsen 
v. Georee W. Roeers Construction Cor~. .  519 F.2d 531. 534 n.2 12d Cir. 1975). Whiie it is ~- ~ -~ 
trui thacsome of the Fifth circuit cases'do not even bother to disduss these supreme Court 
decisions, see, e.g., Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 
(5th Cir. 1972); Delta Engineering Co. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), reh. denied, 325 
F.2d 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), in United States v. 1160.96 Acres of 
Land, Holmes County, Mississippi, 432 F.2d 910, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1970), the court did deal 
with Wood~vortlt. The court does not clearly state that Woodwortfi is inapplicable to modem 
remittitur cases, but it analyzes the reasoning of the case in such a way that this inference can 
clearly be drawn. Id. at 912. 
104. See, e.g., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, Holmes County, Mississippi, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 
1970); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 
1972); Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). 
105. See, e.g., Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974), reh. and 
relz. en bane denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 
19731. 
-- .-,. 
106. Compare Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 
1966), with Gorsalitz v. Olm Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
107. Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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procedure by appealing the conditional new trial-remittitur order was not 
permitted to do so.lo8 
In order to preserve his right to appeal, the plaintiff must accept the 
remittitur conditionally or "under protest."10g The plaintiff can accomplish 
this by including a "protest" statement in his remittitur consent form, 
indicating that he objects to the action of the trial court in making the 
remittitur order, that his sole purpose in agreeing to the remittitur is to 
prevent a new trial, and that he does not intend such consent to preclude 
an appeal.l1° If the plaintiff desires a more limited right of appeal, his 
statement might be to the effect that he agrees to remit, but if the defendant 
appeals, the plaintiff will cross appeal."' Filing "under protest" serves the 
important function of putting the defendant on notice that the plaintiff may 
prosecute an appeal.l12 
One aspect of the Fifth Circuit practice which is not entirely clear is 
whether the plaintiff must refuse to collect the fruits of the diminished 
verdict in order to preserve his right to appeal.l13 In Delta Engineering 
Corp. v. S ~ o t t , " ~  the court assumed 
108. Id. Judicial economy was the primary reason enunciated by the Wiggs court for 
requiring the remittitur before the plaintiff could gain access to the appellate court. 
By this procedure, the determination of the appeals court would be final. If the 
remittitur was in order, the plaintiff has agreed to ~ t ,  the judgment would be  @all and 
no new trial would be required. If the trial court erred in ordering the remlttitur, the 
appellate court could set aside the judgment and order that a judgment be entered on 
the jury verdict. 
Id. at 1283. See also Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 331 
(5th Cir. 1975), in which both parties, apparently encouraged by Fifth Circuit remittitur 
innovations, unsuccessfully tried to appeal from a new trial order. 
109. Minerals & Chemicals Philipp Corp. v. Milwhite, 414 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1969); 
Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). See also 
Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 
Holmes County, Mississippi, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1971), relr. denied, 
409 U.S. 899 (1972), mod., 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972); Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 
F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), reh. denied, 325 F.2d 432 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), 
110. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 
1966). Cf. Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other 
grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973), discussed at note 146 infra. 
111. See, e.g., Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1973). 
112. See note 95 supra. If the defendant knows that the plaintiff might appeal he will not 
be in the position of having to reassemble a case in which he thought that the litigation had 
concluded. Filing "under protest" also eliminates the argument that the plaintiff, by remittrng, 
admitted that the trial court's assessment of damages was proper. See note 84 supra. 
113. Ordinarily a losing defendant will get a stay of execution of the lower court judgment 
until the appeal proceedings are over. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d). If. the defendant posts a 
supersedeas bond with the court, he is entitled to a stay of a money judgment as a matter of 
right. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American BroadcastinpParamount Theatres,.Inc., 
385 U.S. 931 (1966). The question of collection of reduced verdicts by a plajntiff prior to 
appeal comes up only where the defendant did not seek a stay of execution pending appeal. In 
some cases this may occur because of negligence or lack of concern on the part of a defendant 
who intends to prosecute an appeal. At other times, however, the defendan! may not plan to 
appeal the remittitur-reduced verdict. The plaintiff might then obtain the fru~ts of that verdict 
and subsequently appeal, assuming that he had preserved such right by "protest." Usually, it 
would seem that a defendant who has been put on notice of a potential appeal by the plaintiffs 
protested remittitur will himself appeal and obtain the bond. 
114. 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), reh. denied, 325 F.2d 432 (5th Cir:), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 905 (1964). 
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without deciding, that until such time as a plaintiff has actually 
obtained the fruits of a judgment . . . , he is free to challenge the 
legal correctness of the Court-enforced remittitur.l15 
In Steinberg v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America116 the 
court noted, in an apparent afterthought to its holding that the plaintiff was 
entitled to an appeal, "[m]oreover, plaintiff has not collected the judgment 
as reduced."l17 The only other remittitur case in which the Fifth Circuit 
has expressly dealt with this issue was an eminent domain action"* in 
which the plaintiffs had received the remittitur-reduced amount. The court, 
in deeming this collection not equivalent to a waiver of right of appeal, 
stressed the fact that it would be inconsistent with the fifth amendment to 
deprive the plaintiffs of both the use of their land and the use of their 
money while the appeal proceedings dragged on.l19 Since a similar argu- 
ment could be made in other remittitur cases on grounds of simple fairness 
and since the statements in Steinberg and Delta Engineering were not 
binding, it is likely that refusal to accept the fruits of the reduced judgment 
will not be held to be a necessary condition for plaintiff-appeals in the 
future.120 
In Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 121 the Fifth Circuit noted that if a 
plaintiff is allowed to challenge a remittitur order by appeal, 
the burden is a heavy one and the scope of appellate review 
correspondingly narrow. . . . A clear abuse o f .  . . discretion or 
some extraordinary legal situation must be demonstrated to obtain 
relief from such a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
Subsequently the court has established that such abuse will be found only if 
the jury verdict was within the maximum reasonable range possible123 and 
that, on appeal, it will be presumed that the amount of the remittitur 
required by the trial judge is the proper amount to reduce the award to this 
maximum reasonable verdict unless the plaintiff "can point to credible 
115. Id. at 15. 
116. 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966). 
117. Id. at 268. 
118. United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, Holmes County, Mississippi, 432 F.2d 910 
15th Cir. 19701. .- --- -- 
119. ~ d . .  gt 912-13. 
120. This seems especially probable since the only purpose of the rule appears to be to 
keep the defendant from being misled into thinking that the plaintiff was satisfied with the 
reduced verdict. This notice function, however, is already better sewed by the filing "under 
protest" requirement, since "protest" informs the defendant that the plaintiff is definitely 
dissatisfied and probably intends to appeal. 
121. 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), reh. denied, 325 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 905 (1964). 
122. Id. at 15-16. 
123. Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1046 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 899, mod., 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972). This 
standard is like that adopted in some courts for the review of an order granting a new 
trial--less strict than that applied when judge and jury both agree on the award. See note 55 
supra. 
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evidence which would support a greater recovery."lZ4 Thus, although the 
Fifth Circuit plaintiff is entitled to appeal if he remits "under protest," a 
reversal of the trial judge's action is not easily obtained. 
C. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has permitted a remitting plaintiff to appeal in a 
diversity case, but it looked to state statutory law for the authority to do 
so.125 In Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., lZ6 the court held that 
the Erie doctrine127 made a Tennessee statute,128 which provided for such 
appeals, applicable in the federal courts sitting in Tennessee.lZD Although 
the Seventh Circuit has declined to follow similar state statutes,130 noting 
that Mooney was decided before the Erie doctrine was more clearly expli- 
cated in Hanna v. Plumer,131 subsequent cases indicate that Hanna will 
not cause the Sixth Circuit to modify its p0siti0n.l~~ Apparently, no cases 
have come to the Sixth Circuit on appeal from the district courts in 
Kentucky, Michigan, or Ohio,133 and it is unclear whether the circuit will 
follow state law on remitting plaintiff appeals in non-Tennessee cases.134 
124. Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974), rek. and reh. 
en banc denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975). Judge Goldberg in his dissent to the denial of 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc, criticized this standard as putting the burden on the 
plaintiff to prove that he deserved more rather than on the trial judge to justify the remittitur. 
125. Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973); Mooney v. Henderson Portion 
Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). See also Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 
1974). 
126. 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). 
127. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra. 
128. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 27-118 (1955). 
129. In Bristol Gas & Electric Co. v. Boy, 261 F. 297 (6th Cir. 1919), the plaintiff 
remitted "under protest" and attempted to prosecute a cross-appeal, but the court refused to 
review the trial judge's grant of remittitur "in the absence of a statute providing therefor." Id. 
at 302. Tennessee state statutory law permitted this procedure, but the court held that the 
statute was not within the federal Conformity Act and could not be applied by a federal court. 
Id. Interestingly, however, the court did discuss the merits of the appeal, not~ng that since the 
trial court "was well within the limits of a proper discretion, the result would be the same, 
whether the cross-writ [was] dismissed, or the action complained of affirmed." Id. at 302-03. 
It is obvious that this court would have liked to follow Tennessee state practice and 
permit such appeals. With the decision in Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 
(6th Cir. 1964), its wish became a reality. 
130. Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 
1967). -- . .,- 
131. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
132. Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 
F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973). However. the Erie auestion and the state statute were not discussed 
in either of these diversity cases which came up on appeal from the district courts sitting in 
Tennessee. The court in Manning permitted the appeal on the strength of Mooney V. 
Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964), while the Bllrnatt court entertained 
the plaintiffs cross-appeal without comment. 
133. It has been noted that only six states expressly allow remitting plaintiffs an appeal: 
Nebraska, New York, Tennessee, and Texas provide for such appeals by statute, while New 
Jersey and Wisconsin offer this opportunity by judicial action. Note, Civil Proced~rre- 
Remittitur-Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal, 49 N.C. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (1970). 
This is not entirely correct, as an Illinois statute provides that at an appeal by the defendant 
the remitting plaintiff can assert the correctness of the original jury verd~ct. ILL. STAT. ANN., 
ch. 110, 1 68.1(7) (1968). This writer was unable to locate any Michigan, Ohio, or Kentucky 
statute to that effect. 
134. The practice of following state law has been severely criticized on the ground that it 
is solely for the federal courts to decide, within constitutional limits, which appeals it will 
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The present practice in Tennessee Sixth Circuit cases as derived from 
the state statute requires that the plaintiff remit "under protest."135 He 
may register this objection to the trial judge's remittitur order orally as well 
as in writing,136 and it appears that he is not required to refuse to collect his 
reduced judgment in order to preserve his right to appeal.137 The trial court 
remittitur order is subject to review only for abuse of discretion,138 and the 
standard for finding abuse is not as strict as in review of orders denying 
new trial motions.139 As in the Fifth Circuit, no distinction is made be- 
tween an appeal of a new trial-remittitur order made in response to a 
motion by the defendant and an appeal of such order entered on the trial 
judge's own initiative.140 
D.  The Other Circuits 
Although no other circuit has given its unqualified approval to appeals 
by remitting plaintiffs, some appear to be straying from the time-honored 
doctrine that consent, actual or implied, precludes appeal. In a recent 
decision, Bonn v. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., the First 
-- - 
allow and which it will not. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2 , s  2802. See notes 63-66 
and accompanying text supra. 
135. Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 
F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 19731: Moonev v. Henderson Portion Pack Co.. 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). 
136. 1n Mooney v..~enderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 19&4), the plain& 
"announced in open Court that he was accepting the remittitur . . . under protest, and would 
pray an appeal . . . from the action of the Court in remitting . . . damages awarded by the jury." Id. at 8, quoting the order of the district court. The subsequent appeal was permitted. 
137. The plaintiff in Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964), 
had collected his reduced judgment. 
138. Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 133 (6th Cir. 1973). 
139. Id. This is the same standard as that adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See note 123 and 
accompanying text supra. 
140. Compare Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973) (remittitur order 
entered on the trial court's own initiative). with Moonev v. Henderson Portion Pack Co.. 334 
F.2d 7 (6th Cu. 1964) (remittitur order entered in response to defendant's new trial motion). 
One recent Sixth Circuit case, Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974) has 
created a bizarre and unfortunate twist on the remittitur "under protest" procedure. The trial 
court ordered remittiturs without giving the plaintiffs the option of submitting to a new trial. 
Id. at 727. Such actions have always been held improper. See note 79 supra. These remittiturs 
were filed "under protest" and appeals were taken all around. On the plaintiffs' cross-appeal, 
over which the court of appeals assumed jurisdiction, it was held that the remittitur was 
proper. Id. Only then did the court of appeals remand to the district court so that the plaintiffs 
could be afforded the opportunity of accepting the remittitur or submitting to the new trial. Id. 
at 728. 
This is indeed a very curious practice. If the plaintiffs were not given a chance to choose 
initially, why did they have to remit "under protest"? See note 79 and accompanying text 
supra. Even if that was the proper way to get the issue into the court of appeals, that tribunal 
should never have ruled on the merits of the remittitur order before the plaintiffs had made 
their election between remittitur and the new trial. On remand the plaintiffs were in the unique 
position of knowing how their appeal would turn out before they had to make their choice. In ' 
effect, they lost their appeal, but still could have their new trial. This situation is not only 
clearly bizarre, but is also patently unfair to the defendant. 
141. 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975). The plaintiffs, administratrix and three children of 
parents who died in a plane crash, were awarded a total recovery of $1,385,605 (!) by the jury-$1,045,000 for their pain, suffering and mental anguish, $304,605 for economic loss, and 
$36,000 for the decedents' conscious pain and suffering. The defendants' motions for new 
trials or remittiturs were denied except for a $26,000 remittitur of the award for decedents' 
pain and suffering! The defendants appealed the other awards as excessive and the plaintiffs 
appealed the remittitur to which they had consented. 
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Circuit assumed that "an appeal lies from a consented-to remitt i t~r," '~~ 
but found it unnecessary to entertain the plaintiffs' appeal since "the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a remittitur . . . . "143 
There was no indication in the opinion that the plaintiffs had accepted the 
remittitur "under protest" or had in any other manner noted that their 
assent was conditionally given. A single case, however, can hardly be 
considered conclusive evidence that "protest" will not be required if and 
when the First Circuit squarely faces the remitting-plaintiff appeal issue.144 
The Third Circuit has also allowed some innovation. A plaintiff at- 
tempted to preserve his right to appeal on a consented-to remittitur in 
Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, The district court permitted the plaintiff 
to fle his remittitur "under protest" but noted that the question of whether 
the plaintiff could "challenge the propriety of the remittitur, [was] . . . for 
the appellate tribunal to decide."14'j On appeal the plaintiff's cross-appeal 
was mentioned but not discussed, since the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial on all issues.147 The appellate court did 
not, however, reject the contention that an appeal would lie. 
The Second Circuit has never expressly permitted appeals from 
consented-to remittiturs, but its attitude on the subject has been quite 
equiv0ca1.l~~ The court, in Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constriiction 
Corp., 149 recently reviewed some of the modern remitting-plaintiff appeal 
procedures but declined to reach a decision until it was faced "squarely" 
with the issue.150 
142. Id. at 94. 
143. Id. The court of appeals noted that "there was no direct evidence as to decedents' 
conscious pain and suffering and . . . any suffering that might have occurred could not have 
lasted more than seconds anyway." Id. 
144. A problem of notice to defendants might arise if no "protest" is required. A 
defendant should be entitled to some measure of reliance on a plaintiffs acceptance of a 
remittitur order. See note 120 and accompanying text supra. 
145. 329 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 
19711 
--. -,. 
146. Id. at 1171. The plaintiff had sought an amendment to his remittitur containing the 
following language: 
[ 4 h e  plaintiffs filing of the remittitur shall not be construed to mean that the plaintiff 
agrees with the court's judgment, and should the defendant thereafter file a notice of 
appeal, the plaintiff shall have ten (10) days thereafter in which to file a cross-appenl, 
said cross-appeal preserving to the plaintiff his right to challenge the court's discre- 
tion in ordering the remittitur. 
Id. at 1170, quoting the requested amendment. He had to settle, however, for merely filing 
"under  rotes st." 
~ - - -  .-r - - - - - - -  
147. 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973). 
148. In Bums v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941), the court noted that 
"[tlhe action of the trial court in requiring" the plaintiff to elect a new trial or remittitur "if 
ever reviewable in a federal a ~ ~ e l l a t e  court. can only be reviewed when there has been a plain 
abuse of discretion." Id. at 2% (emphasis added). On finding no clear abuse of discretion; the 
court dismissed plaintiffs appeal. Id. A few ears later, however, in Mattox v. News 
Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. Jnied,  338 U.S. 858 (1949), the court dis- 
missed a plaintiff's appeal from an unprotested, consented-to remittitur in short order. The 
most recent decision discussing this issue, Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Construction 
Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975), indicates that the court may be shifting from the Mattox 
position. See notes 149-50 and accompanying text infra. 
149. 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975). 
150. The trial court had ordered a remittitur, but the plaintiff refused to remit and at the 
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So far as can be determined, no other circuit has ever allowed an 
appeal by a remitting plaintiff.151 In at least one circuit, the Seventh, 
remitting plaintiffs have tried to prosecute appeals,152 but the court has 
refused to budge. It remains to be seen whether other circuits, if similarly 
pressed, will prove equally resolute defenders of tradition. 
The traditional rules of remittitur procedure effectively coerce plain- 
tiffs into accepting smaller verdicts than the ones to which they believe 
themselves entitled.153 Remittitur under protest is an effective antidote to 
this coercion. A plaintiff who is permitted an appeal from a consented-to 
remittitur will not feel obliged to opt for a new trial in order to obtain his 
"day in court"; on appeal he can rebut the trial judge's findings of exces- 
siveness. The coercive effect of remittitur is reduced: in appealing, the 
plaintiff risks only the part of his jury verdict in excess of the remittitur- 
reduced award. Ideally, the workload of the courts is also reduced if 
plaintiff appeals are allowed, since plaintiffs will opt for new trials less 
frequently. 
Allowing appeals by remitting plaintiffs does not, however, solve all 
same time, by a writ of mandamus, tried to waive his right to a new trial and to have the 
reduced verdict entered as a final judgment from which he could appeal. Id. at 533. This was 
denied, and the ensuing new trial resulted in a much smaller verdict. After that final judgment 
was entered, the plaintiff appealed claiming inter alia that it was error to deny him the right to 
remit under protest. The court of appeals refused to decide whether remitting-plaintiff appeals 
would thereafter be permitted in the Second Circuit, noting that here the plaintiff had not tried 
to remit and then appeal but had instead "sought the issuance of mandamus, a remedy granted 
by this court only-under exceptional circumstances." Id. at 536. 
151. See. e.p.. S. Birch & Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
837 (1957), relYi i ion Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894).'Lewis, however, can hardly be 
considered applicable to a case such as S. Birch & Sons in which there was no defendant 
waiver of right to appeal, no signed acknowledgment of satisfaction, no lengthy delay before 
attempting the cross-appeal, and no jurisdictional issue. See notes 95-96 and accompanying 
- - 
text s ip r i .  
152. Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Rothschild v. Drake Hotel, Inc., 
397 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1968); Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 
382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967); Casko v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 361 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966). 
No remitting-plaintiff appeals cases have arisen in the Seventh Circuit for over five years; 
perhaps the plaintiffs have finally given up. 
In one of these cases, plaintiffs attempted to appeal from voluntary, consented-to remit- 
titur. Casko v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 361 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966). The court dismissed plaintiff's 
appeal as improper, citing Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965), a 
case which the Fifth Circuit later read as holding that a plaintiff appeal would not lie from an 
unprotested, consented-to remittitur. Minerals & Chemicals Philipp Corp. v. Milwhite Co., 
414 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1969). 
In two other cases, the remittiturs were filed "under protest." Collum v. Butler, 421 
F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Rothschild v. Drake Hotel, Inc., 397 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1968). In 
Rotl~sclzild the court did touch on the merits of the appeal, finding the remittitur order not an 
abuse of discretion, 397 F.2d at 426, but in Collurn the court was again steadfast in its 
adherence to the "no appeal" rule. 
Another plaintiff based his cross-appeal on an Illinois statute. Dorin v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967). The statute gives the 
remitting plaintiff access to the appellate courts if and only if the defendant had already 
annealed. ILL. STAT. ANN.. ch. 110. 5 68.1(7) (1968). The Seventh Circuit, however, refused 
tGSadopt the state rule. 382 F.2d at 79. see-note 130 and accompanying text supra. 
153. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra. 
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the problems of traditional remittitur practice-the constitutional and pub- 
lic policy issues are not resolved, and the question of standards to be 
applied by the trial or appellate courts is not resolved. In some respects the 
new appeal procedures are not unequivocally helpful and in others they 
may even create new problems. 
Defendants, for example, have valid objections to appeals by plain- 
tiffs. The defendant is told that he can have a new trial if the plaintiff does 
not remit. The defendant may not agree that the amount of the proposed 
remittitur is adequate to cure the defective verdict; yet the plaintiff has the 
privilege of cutting off the defendant's new trial by remitting. Althouth he 
must forfeit part of his verdict, the plaintiff still comes out as the winner. 
The only corresponding privilege the defendant has under traditional prac- 
tice is the right to prosecute an appeal while the plaintiff is barred. This 
advantage disappears if the plaintiff is also allowed to appeal. In fact, the 
scale is tipped heavily in favor of the plaintiff since he has nothing to lose 
by taking an appeal and everything to gain: if the plaintiff wins on his 
appeal, his jury verdict will be reinstated; if he loses, he is still permitted to 
keep the reduced verdict. Even if the defendant prevails on his own appeal 
the worst possible result for the plaintiff would be a new 'trial, a possibility 
which does not turn on whether the plaintiff is part of the appeals process 
or not. Favoring the plaintiff in this way may be defended on the ground 
that the court is stepping outside its province to tamper with the jury 
verdict in the first place and should therefore make amends for such 
interference. 
Additional unfairneis to the defendant, however, will occur if the 
plaintiff is allowed to appeal without fling "under protest," since the 
defendant will have no notice of the plaintiffs intentions.'" Some sort of 
conditional language should be required in order to avoid this danger.lG5 
The impact of a plaintiff appeal procedure on the workloads of the 
courts is far from clear. Professor Moore has suggested that plaintiff 
appeals are basically a waste of time.lS6 He noted that when the court of 
appeals rules that the remittitur order is incorrect, the case is reversed and 
remanded to the district court for a ruling on the defendant's new trial 
motion uncluttered by the remittitur question. But the trial judge has 
already decided that the verdict is excessive and now has been told that the 
ordered remittitur is improper. There is only one reasonable ruling that the 
trial court can make at this point--order a new trial-thereby putting the 
154. See notes 95 and 112 and accompanying text supra. 
155. If remittitur under protest became a common practice in all remittitur cases, defen- 
dant notification might not be necessary. The defendant would assume, as he now does after 
an ordinary final judgment is entered, that the plaintiff will appeal. 
156. 6 k  J. MOORE, supra note 2, fl 59.05[3], at n.42i. 
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sadder but wiser plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied if he 
had refused to remit initially. Professor Moore concludes: 
It appears, then, that in a jurisdiction in which the standard for a 
new trial on the ground of excessive verdict is broader than the 
ground for remittitur, the right to appeal is chimerical unless the 
court of appeals will rule upon the propriety of the grant of a new 
trial or decrease the remittitur a m 0 ~ n t . l ~ ~  
With all deference to Professor Moore, it is not entirely true that all 
plaintiff appeals waste time. It is possible that on remand the trial court will 
order a smaller remittitur or will reinstate the jury verdict. The appellate 
court may also resolve the issue by reviewing the original verdict, as 
Professor Moore suggests. In other cases the court of appeals will hold that 
the remittitur was not an abuse of discretion. Then the plaintiff will neces- 
sarily relent without putting his entire verdict on the line and without 
having to go through the expense and delay of a new trial. In these 
situations the plaintiff would not find himself in the anomalous position of 
having prosecuted an appeal to achieve a result more easily obtained by 
merely refusing to remit. 
Even if a remitting plaintiff appeal procedure is not in itself a waste of 
time, it is highly debatable whether the practice actually reduces the judi- 
cial workload or merely shifts the burden from the district courts to the 
courts of appeals.15* Arguably, appellate court caseload will increase 
dramatically. A plaintiff usually does not opt for a new trial unless very 
dissatisfied, since new trials are expensive and time consuming. Appeals 
are less costly, and, as noted above, a plaintiff has nothing to lose by 
appealing, so it seems that such appeals will be taken almost as a matter of 
course. On the other hand, it is strongly argued that frivolous appeals will 
not be taken for at least two reasons:lS9 (1) the standard of review of the 
propriety of a remittitur order is abuse of discretion; and (2) appeals are not 
free. Consideration should also be given to the fact that the busiest circuit 
in the United States, the Fifth, uses the new procedure,160 and must 
therefore believe it to be economical. Finally, it is noteworthy that under 
traditional remittitur practice, the plaintiff can always appeal the new 
trial-remittitur order if he first submits to a second trial, and at that point he 
157. Id. 
158. See Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Construction Co., 519 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 
1975) (discussion of contentions of plaintiff and defendant on this issue). 
159. Id. at 535 (discussion of plaintiffs contention on this issue). 
160. In Reinertsen, id. at 535-36, Judge Feinberg suggested that statistical studies could 
answer some of these judicial economy questions. If the percentage of Fifth Circuit remitting 
plaintiffs who appeal could be compared with the percentage of plaintiffs in "no appeal" 
jurisdictions who opt for new trials, the relative efficiencies could be evaluated. Unfortu- 
nately, the Fifth Circuit maintains no such statistics. 
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has no more to lose than the remitting plaintiff who directly appeals a 
remittitur entered "under protest." 
While the remitting plaintiff appeal procedures employed by the vari- 
ous circuits do solve some of the problems of traditional remittitur practice, 
there is definitely room for improvement in some areas. As noted above, 
some variations in appeals practices are especially unfair to the defendant. 
  his problem could be easily solved if all courts which permit plaintiff 
appeals from consented-to remittiturs adopt certain uniform rules: the 
remittitur must be fled "under protest" in order to preserve a right of 
appeal, and in the trial court the plaintiff must be afforded the election of 
remittitur or new trial. It will also be fairer to the defendant if the plaintiff 
is not permitted to accept the fruits of the reduced judgment if he intends to 
prosecute an appeal. 
Some of the inherent defects of the traditional "no appeal" rule and of 
present innovative practices could be cured by an intermediate position on 
consenting plaintiff appeals-that such appeals should be entertained only 
if the defendant has already appealed in the cause of action. It has been 
noted that allowing the plaintiff to appeal unconditionally "provides no 
incentive to achieve finality at trial because the plaintiff's right to appeal is 
completely independent of the defendant's action following judgment in the 
lower court."161 On the other hand, permitting only plaintiff cross-appeals 
but no unilateral plaintiff appeals would encourage the defendant to make a 
considered appraisal of the merits of his appeal prior to seeking review. 
The defendant would tend to think twice before prosecuting an appeal 
which automatically opens the door to the higher court for the plaintiff.i02 
The plaintiff would not be able to use remittitur merely to get to the 
appellate court, since he would not know if the defendant himself would 
appeal and thereby pave the way for the plaintiff's appeal. Therefore, if the 
remittitur were totally unacceptable, the plaintiff would opt for the new 
trial rather than risk preclusion from any further proceedings. The defen- 
dant would have the opportunity to end the litigation if the plaintiff agreed 
to remit. In fact, this would function much like asking the defendant for his 
consent to the r emi t t i t~ r , ' ~~  certainly a fairer result. The defendant would 
not be tempted to prosecute frivolous appeals in the hope that the court 
might reduce the verdict a little more, nor could he proceed one-sidedly on 
appeal. Either the appellate tribunal would hear both sides of the story or 
neither. 
161. Note, Civil Procedure-Remittitur-Rernitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal, 
supra note 133, at 145. 
162. Id. 
163. See note 79 supra. 
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Under this procedure a few more new trials would be elected by 
plaintiffs than would be chosen if a full, free plaintiff-appeals device were 
adopted. However, many appeals will be avoided, and this saving should 
more than compensate for the possibility of more new trials. 
Irene Sann 
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